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No exploitation reported

CVE-2026-99081

No exploitation reported by the sources we read.

  • Published2026-10-23

Am I affected?

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Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bnxt_en: fix DMA mapping length for padded small packets Stefan Fleischmann reported Intel IOMMU DMA Read faults on BCM57412 NetXtreme-E NICs when transmitting packets on VLAN/macvlan interfaces: DMAR: [DMA Read NO_PASID] Request device [18:00.0] fault addr 0xfc499000 [fault reason 0x06] PTE Read access is not set bnxt_en 0000:18:00.0 eno1np0: Abandoning msg {0xb4 0x41a} len: 0 due to firmware status: 0x2000001 ... NETDEV WATCHDOG: eno1np0 (bnxt_en): transmit queue 0 timed out The fault address (0xfc499000) is on an exact 4KB page boundary, pointing to a DMA read buffer overrun. In bnxt_start_xmit(), packets smaller than BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE (52 bytes), such as 42-byte untagged ARP frames, are padded: if (length < BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE) { pad = BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE - length; if (skb_pad(skb, pad)) goto tx_kick_pending; length = BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE; } mapping = dma_map_single(&pdev->dev, skb->data, len, DMA_TO_DEVICE); ... dma_unmap_len_set(tx_buf, len, len); However, 'len' was initialized earlier to skb_headlen(skb) (e.g. 42 bytes) and is left unadjusted after padding. Consequently, dma_map_single() and dma_unmap_len_set() map and track only 42 bytes. Later, the hardware TX buffer descriptor is programmed with the padded length: txbd->tx_bd_len_flags_type = cpu_to_le32(((len + pad) << TX_BD_LEN_SHIFT) | flags | TX_BD_FLAGS_PACKET_END); The NIC DMA engine is thus instructed to read 52 bytes from a region where only 42 bytes were DMA-mapped. If skb->data ends near the boundary of a 4KB page (within 'pad' bytes of the next page), the hardware DMA read overruns into the unmapped adjacent page, triggering an IOMMU fault. This issue was exposed after commit 447cbe95ebb9 ("vlan: fix skb_under_panic and races when toggling HW VLAN offload") because reserving extra VLAN headroom rounded LL_RESERVED_SPACE from 48 up to 64 bytes, shifting skb->data offsets and potentially causing small frames to land right against page boundaries. Fix this by using skb_put_padto(skb, BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE) in bnxt_start_xmit(), before skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags is sampled, because padding might linearize the skb. This ensures skb->len and skb_headlen(skb) reflect the padded size so that dma_map_single() maps the full buffer and the descriptor length is consistent. This also removes the temporary 'pad' variable and masking logic. The padding is done after the SW USO branch, otherwise bnxt_sw_udp_gso_xmit() would account the padding as UDP payload and send it in extra segments. Note that SW USO segments are still not padded: with IPv4, a segment carrying less than 10 bytes of UDP payload (small gso_size, or a short last segment) is sent as a frame shorter than BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE. This is a separate issue, left for a followup patch.

Timeline

dates in UTC
  1. 2026-10-2313:17CVE publishedNVD

Observed activity

isMalicious corpus · updated 2026-10-24 15:37 UTC
Indicators tagged with this CVE, per day0 indicators over 7 days
Block these indicators
  • Firewall list (EDL, text): https://api.ismalicious.com/edl/cve/CVE-2026-99081?format=txt
  • CSV export: https://api.ismalicious.com/edl/cve/CVE-2026-99081?format=csv
  • TAXII collection of exploited CVEs
  • The EDL and CSV take an API key on the Pro plan.

Versions per branch

Neither OSV.dev nor the vendor advisories we read list affected versions for CVE-2026-99081 yet.

Full record on NVD

Fix

No fix published by the sources we read yet. NVD record

Detection

Nuclei template
none so far
ProjectDiscovery
Exploit-DB
no entry
Exploit-DB
Proof-of-concept repositories
none listed
PoC-in-GitHub

Sources

  • NVDCVE recordread 2026-10-24
  • CNACVSS 3.17.5read 2026-10-24

Technical details

CVSS v3 Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Published
2026-10-23
Last Modified
2026-10-24
NVD status
Received

Frequently asked questions

What is CVE-2026-99081?

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bnxt_en: fix DMA mapping length for padded small packets Stefan Fleischmann reported Intel IOMMU DMA Read faults on BCM57412 NetXtreme-E NICs when transmitting packets on VLAN/macvlan interfaces: DMAR: [DMA Read NO_PASID] Request device [18:00.0] fault addr 0xfc499000 [fault reason 0x06] PTE Read access is not set bnxt_en 0000:18:00.0 eno1np0: Abandoning msg {0xb4 0x41a} len: 0 due to firmware status: 0x2000001 ... NETDEV WATCHDOG: eno1np0 (bnxt_en): transmit queue 0 timed out The fault address (0xfc499000) is on an exact 4KB page boundary, pointing to a DMA read buffer overrun. In bnxt_start_xmit(), packets smaller than BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE (52 bytes), such as 42-byte untagged ARP frames, are padded: if (length < BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE) { pad = BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE - length; if (skb_pad(skb, pad)) goto tx_kick_pending; length = BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE; } mapping = dma_map_single(&pdev->dev, skb->data, len, DMA_TO_DEVICE); ... dma_unmap_len_set(tx_buf, len, len); However, 'len' was initialized earlier to skb_headlen(skb) (e.g. 42 bytes) and is left unadjusted after padding. Consequently, dma_map_single() and dma_unmap_len_set() map and track only 42 bytes. Later, the hardware TX buffer descriptor is programmed with the padded length: txbd->tx_bd_len_flags_type = cpu_to_le32(((len + pad) << TX_BD_LEN_SHIFT) | flags | TX_BD_FLAGS_PACKET_END); The NIC DMA engine is thus instructed to read 52 bytes from a region where only 42 bytes were DMA-mapped. If skb->data ends near the boundary of a 4KB page (within 'pad' bytes of the next page), the hardware DMA read overruns into the unmapped adjacent page, triggering an IOMMU fault. This issue was exposed after commit 447cbe95ebb9 ("vlan: fix skb_under_panic and races when toggling HW VLAN offload") because reserving extra VLAN headroom rounded LL_RESERVED_SPACE from 48 up to 64 bytes, shifting skb->data offsets and potentially causing small frames to land right against page boundaries. Fix this by using skb_put_padto(skb, BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE) in bnxt_start_xmit(), before skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags is sampled, because padding might linearize the skb. This ensures skb->len and skb_headlen(skb) reflect the padded size so that dma_map_single() maps the full buffer and the descriptor length is consistent. This also removes the temporary 'pad' variable and masking logic. The padding is done after the SW USO branch, otherwise bnxt_sw_udp_gso_xmit() would account the padding as UDP payload and send it in extra segments. Note that SW USO segments are still not padded: with IPv4, a segment carrying less than 10 bytes of UDP payload (small gso_size, or a short last segment) is sent as a frame shorter than BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE. This is a separate issue, left for a followup patch.

Is CVE-2026-99081 actively exploited?

Active exploitation of CVE-2026-99081 has not been confirmed.

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-99081?

CVE-2026-99081 has a CVSS v3 base score of 7.5 (HIGH severity), with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.

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