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No exploitation reported

CVE-2026-98988

No exploitation reported by the sources we read.

  • Published2026-10-23

Am I affected?

With a domain, we read the version its public headers and pages expose. A distribution build can carry the fix under an older number.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: keep covered mounts covered in OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE open_tree(OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE) creates a new mount namespace from a copy of the tree at the given path. The caller needs to be privileged over its current user namespace because the new mount namespace will be owned by it. It doesn't need to be privileged over the mount namespace the tree is copied from. An unprivileged user just needs to create a user namespace first. The copy follows the rules of a detached bind mount. Without AT_RECURSIVE only the mount itself is cloned and its children are left out. With AT_RECURSIVE unbindable mounts are skipped. Both is fine when the caller has privileges over the source mount namespace because it could unmount those mounts anyway. Not so for an unprivileged user in that mount namespace. For them a mount namespace copy is what unshare() does. copy_mnt_ns() copies everything including unbindable mounts and lock_mnt_tree() makes sure nothing can be unmounted in the copy. Nothing that was covered gets revealed. create_new_namespace() only does the locking and so the covered content is right there in the new mount namespace: # mount -t tmpfs none /tmp/otn; mkdir /tmp/otn/covered # echo hidden > /tmp/otn/covered/under.txt # mount -t tmpfs none /tmp/otn/covered uid 1000, after unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER): fd = open_tree(AT_FDCWD, "/tmp/otn", OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE); setns(fd, CLONE_NEWNS); open("/covered/under.txt", O_RDONLY) -> "hidden" Covering paths with mounts is how container runtimes mask parts of /proc and /sys and how admins hide things. When the caller's user namespace doesn't own the source mount namespace copy the way unshare() does and refuse a non-recursive copy of a mount that has anything mounted below the requested directory and copy unbindable mounts in a recursive copy. A caller that is privileged over the source mount namespace sees no change.

Timeline

dates in UTC
  1. 2026-10-2313:17CVE publishedNVD

Observed activity

isMalicious corpus · updated 2026-10-24 15:37 UTC
Indicators tagged with this CVE, per day0 indicators over 7 days
Block these indicators
  • Firewall list (EDL, text): https://api.ismalicious.com/edl/cve/CVE-2026-98988?format=txt
  • CSV export: https://api.ismalicious.com/edl/cve/CVE-2026-98988?format=csv
  • TAXII collection of exploited CVEs
  • The EDL and CSV take an API key on the Pro plan.

Versions per branch

Neither OSV.dev nor the vendor advisories we read list affected versions for CVE-2026-98988 yet.

Full record on NVD

Fix

No fix published by the sources we read yet. NVD record

Detection

Nuclei template
none so far
ProjectDiscovery
Exploit-DB
no entry
Exploit-DB
Proof-of-concept repositories
none listed
PoC-in-GitHub

Sources

  • NVDCVE recordread 2026-10-24
  • CNACVSS 3.18.8read 2026-10-24

Technical details

CVSS v3 Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Published
2026-10-23
Last Modified
2026-10-24
NVD status
Received

Frequently asked questions

What is CVE-2026-98988?

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: keep covered mounts covered in OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE open_tree(OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE) creates a new mount namespace from a copy of the tree at the given path. The caller needs to be privileged over its current user namespace because the new mount namespace will be owned by it. It doesn't need to be privileged over the mount namespace the tree is copied from. An unprivileged user just needs to create a user namespace first. The copy follows the rules of a detached bind mount. Without AT_RECURSIVE only the mount itself is cloned and its children are left out. With AT_RECURSIVE unbindable mounts are skipped. Both is fine when the caller has privileges over the source mount namespace because it could unmount those mounts anyway. Not so for an unprivileged user in that mount namespace. For them a mount namespace copy is what unshare() does. copy_mnt_ns() copies everything including unbindable mounts and lock_mnt_tree() makes sure nothing can be unmounted in the copy. Nothing that was covered gets revealed. create_new_namespace() only does the locking and so the covered content is right there in the new mount namespace: # mount -t tmpfs none /tmp/otn; mkdir /tmp/otn/covered # echo hidden > /tmp/otn/covered/under.txt # mount -t tmpfs none /tmp/otn/covered uid 1000, after unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER): fd = open_tree(AT_FDCWD, "/tmp/otn", OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE); setns(fd, CLONE_NEWNS); open("/covered/under.txt", O_RDONLY) -> "hidden" Covering paths with mounts is how container runtimes mask parts of /proc and /sys and how admins hide things. When the caller's user namespace doesn't own the source mount namespace copy the way unshare() does and refuse a non-recursive copy of a mount that has anything mounted below the requested directory and copy unbindable mounts in a recursive copy. A caller that is privileged over the source mount namespace sees no change.

Is CVE-2026-98988 actively exploited?

Active exploitation of CVE-2026-98988 has not been confirmed.

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-98988?

CVE-2026-98988 has a CVSS v3 base score of 8.8 (HIGH severity), with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H.

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