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HIGH

CVE-2026-78165

CVSS v3

8.8

HIGH

EPSS Score

—

exploit probability

CISA KEV

No

known exploited

Exploitation

—

SSVC status

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Affected and fixed versions

Neither OSV.dev nor the vendor advisories we read list affected versions for CVE-2026-78165 yet.

Full record on NVD

Description

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Spring Redis component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 2.11.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. RedisConfiguration.getSerializer lazily built a bare JdkSerializationRedisSerializer whenever no serializer option was configured, and that instance was used for every read the component performs. Spring's implementation delegates through DeserializingConverter to DefaultDeserializer, which reads the bytes with a ConfigurableObjectInputStream and installs no java.io.ObjectInputFilter on the stream, so an arbitrary serialized class graph was materialised and its readObject method executed. RedisConsumer.setBody applied that serializer to the raw bytes of every message published to the subscribed channels, before the Exchange was constructed and therefore before any route logic could inspect the message, so an actor able to issue PUBLISH on a subscribed channel reached the deserialization sink directly. The same default serializer backed the RedisTemplate built by RedisConfiguration.createDefaultTemplate, so the producer read commands GET, HGET, HGETALL and HVALS deserialized whatever was stored in the Redis keyspace, and SpringRedisIdempotentRepository shared that template. Configuring a custom redisTemplate did not close the consumer path, because RedisConsumer.setBody reads getSerializer directly rather than the serializer attached to the template, so a deployment that had wired a String serializer into its own template remained exposed on the consumer side unless it also set the serializer option. The component never constructed a java.io.ObjectInputStream itself, which is why earlier passes over the Camel codebase for unfiltered Java deserialization did not reach it. The behaviour dates back to the introduction of the component, first released in 2.11.0, and was unchanged until this fix. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, set the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter system property, which the affected code path honours because it reads through a java.io.ObjectInputStream, for example -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!* ; or set the serializer endpoint option to a serializer that does not use Java serialization, such as StringRedisSerializer, noting that this must be set as the serializer option and not only on a custom redisTemplate. As defence in depth, require authentication on the Redis instance and restrict which clients may publish to the subscribed channels, and do not expose a Redis instance consumed by Camel to untrusted networks.

Technical details

CVSS v3 Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Published
2026-10-19
Last Modified
2026-10-19

Frequently asked questions

What is CVE-2026-78165?

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Spring Redis component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 2.11.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. RedisConfiguration.getSerializer lazily built a bare JdkSerializationRedisSerializer whenever no serializer option was configured, and that instance was used for every read the component performs. Spring's implementation delegates through DeserializingConverter to DefaultDeserializer, which reads the bytes with a ConfigurableObjectInputStream and installs no java.io.ObjectInputFilter on the stream, so an arbitrary serialized class graph was materialised and its readObject method executed. RedisConsumer.setBody applied that serializer to the raw bytes of every message published to the subscribed channels, before the Exchange was constructed and therefore before any route logic could inspect the message, so an actor able to issue PUBLISH on a subscribed channel reached the deserialization sink directly. The same default serializer backed the RedisTemplate built by RedisConfiguration.createDefaultTemplate, so the producer read commands GET, HGET, HGETALL and HVALS deserialized whatever was stored in the Redis keyspace, and SpringRedisIdempotentRepository shared that template. Configuring a custom redisTemplate did not close the consumer path, because RedisConsumer.setBody reads getSerializer directly rather than the serializer attached to the template, so a deployment that had wired a String serializer into its own template remained exposed on the consumer side unless it also set the serializer option. The component never constructed a java.io.ObjectInputStream itself, which is why earlier passes over the Camel codebase for unfiltered Java deserialization did not reach it. The behaviour dates back to the introduction of the component, first released in 2.11.0, and was unchanged until this fix. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, set the JVM-wide jdk.serialFilter system property, which the affected code path honours because it reads through a java.io.ObjectInputStream, for example -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!* ; or set the serializer endpoint option to a serializer that does not use Java serialization, such as StringRedisSerializer, noting that this must be set as the serializer option and not only on a custom redisTemplate. As defence in depth, require authentication on the Redis instance and restrict which clients may publish to the subscribed channels, and do not expose a Redis instance consumed by Camel to untrusted networks.

Is CVE-2026-78165 actively exploited?

Active exploitation of CVE-2026-78165 has not been confirmed.

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-78165?

CVE-2026-78165 has a CVSS v3 base score of 8.8 (HIGH severity), with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.

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