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Public proof of conceptFix available

CVE-2026-33619

A public proof of concept exists; no exploitation attested.

  • Published2026-03-26
  • Fixed in0.8.4
  • WeaknessCWE-918

Am I affected?

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Description

PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab v0.8.3 contains a server-side request forgery issue in the optional scheduler's webhook delivery path. When a task is submitted to `POST /tasks` with a user-controlled `callbackUrl`, the v0.8.3 scheduler sends an outbound HTTP `POST` to that URL when the task reaches a terminal state. In that release, the webhook path validated only the URL scheme and did not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public destinations. Because the v0.8.3 implementation also used the default HTTP client behavior, redirects were followed and the destination was not pinned to validated IPs. This allowed blind SSRF from the PinchTab server to attacker-chosen HTTP(S) targets reachable from the server. This issue is narrower than a general unauthenticated internet-facing SSRF. The scheduler is optional and off by default, and in token-protected deployments the attacker must already be able to submit tasks using the server's master API token. In PinchTab's intended deployment model, that token represents administrative control rather than a low-privilege role. Tokenless deployments lower the barrier further, but that is a separate insecure configuration state rather than impact created by the webhook bug itself. PinchTab's default deployment model is local-first and user-controlled, with loopback bind and token-based access in the recommended setup. That lowers practical risk in default use, even though it does not remove the underlying webhook issue when the scheduler is enabled and reachable. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by validating callback targets before dispatch, rejecting non-public IP ranges, pinning delivery to validated IPs, disabling redirect following, and validating `callbackUrl` during task submission.

Timeline

dates in UTC
  1. 2026-03-2621:17CVE publishedNVD

Observed activity

isMalicious corpus · updated 2026-10-23 21:37 UTC
Indicators tagged with this CVE, per day0 indicators over 7 days
Block these indicators
  • Firewall list (EDL, text): https://api.ismalicious.com/edl/cve/CVE-2026-33619?format=txt
  • CSV export: https://api.ismalicious.com/edl/cve/CVE-2026-33619?format=csv
  • TAXII collection of exploited CVEs
  • The EDL and CSV take an API key on the Pro plan.

Versions per branch

NVD · OSV
Pinchtab
BranchAffectedFixed in
0.8< 0.8.40.8.4

as publishedRanges as NVD and OSV publish them; a distribution’s build can be fixed under an older number.

Fix

  1. Update Pinchtab to 0.8.4

Advisories and patches

Detection

Nuclei template
none so far
ProjectDiscovery
Exploit-DB
no entry
Exploit-DB
Proof-of-concept repositories
none listed
PoC-in-GitHub

Sources

  • CISA-ADPSSVC decisionpoc2026-03-30
  • OpenCVESSVC decisionpoc—
  • CNACVSS 3.14.1read 2026-10-23
  • NVDCVSS 3.15.5read 2026-10-23
  • CNAweakness (CWE)CWE-918read 2026-10-23
  • FIRST EPSSEPSS score0.4 %2026-10-23
  • OSVaffected packages—

Technical details

CVSS v3 Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Published
2026-03-26
Last Modified
2026-06-17
NVD status
Analyzed

Frequently asked questions

What is CVE-2026-33619?

PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab v0.8.3 contains a server-side request forgery issue in the optional scheduler's webhook delivery path. When a task is submitted to `POST /tasks` with a user-controlled `callbackUrl`, the v0.8.3 scheduler sends an outbound HTTP `POST` to that URL when the task reaches a terminal state. In that release, the webhook path validated only the URL scheme and did not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public destinations. Because the v0.8.3 implementation also used the default HTTP client behavior, redirects were followed and the destination was not pinned to validated IPs. This allowed blind SSRF from the PinchTab server to attacker-chosen HTTP(S) targets reachable from the server. This issue is narrower than a general unauthenticated internet-facing SSRF. The scheduler is optional and off by default, and in token-protected deployments the attacker must already be able to submit tasks using the server's master API token. In PinchTab's intended deployment model, that token represents administrative control rather than a low-privilege role. Tokenless deployments lower the barrier further, but that is a separate insecure configuration state rather than impact created by the webhook bug itself. PinchTab's default deployment model is local-first and user-controlled, with loopback bind and token-based access in the recommended setup. That lowers practical risk in default use, even though it does not remove the underlying webhook issue when the scheduler is enabled and reachable. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by validating callback targets before dispatch, rejecting non-public IP ranges, pinning delivery to validated IPs, disabling redirect following, and validating `callbackUrl` during task submission.

Is CVE-2026-33619 actively exploited?

A proof-of-concept exploit exists for CVE-2026-33619, but active exploitation has not been confirmed at this time.

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-33619?

CVE-2026-33619 has a CVSS v3 base score of 5.5 (MEDIUM severity), with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N.

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