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No exploitation reportedAwaiting NVD analysis

CVE-2026-120307

Beta9 container escape via unvalidated sandbox file paths

No exploitation reported by the sources we read.

  • Published2026-11-01
  • WeaknessCWE-22 · CWE-23 · CWE-59

Am I affected?

With a domain, we read the version its public headers and pages expose. A distribution build can carry the fix under an older number.

Description

The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant's container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount's source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker's own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod's Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.

Timeline

dates in UTC
  1. 2026-11-0112:49CVE publishedCNA

Observed activity

isMalicious corpus · updated 2026-11-01 09:37 UTC
Indicators tagged with this CVE, per day0 indicators over 7 days
Block these indicators
  • Firewall list (EDL, text): https://api.ismalicious.com/edl/cve/CVE-2026-120307?format=txt
  • CSV export: https://api.ismalicious.com/edl/cve/CVE-2026-120307?format=csv
  • TAXII collection of exploited CVEs
  • The EDL and CSV take an API key on the Pro plan.

Versions per branch

Products declared by the CNA

As JFROG, the CNA that assigned this CVE, declared them in the CVE record; versions as written. NVD lists no product for this CVE yet: this is the only product data so far.

Source: the CNA record (CVE Program), © The MITRE Corporation,CVE Terms of UseCVE recordupdated 2026-11-01

Neither OSV.dev nor the vendor advisories we read list affected versions for CVE-2026-120307 yet.

Full record on NVD

Fix

No fix published by the sources we read yet. NVD record

Detection

Nuclei template
none so far
ProjectDiscovery
Exploit-DB
no entry
Exploit-DB
Proof-of-concept repositories
none listed
PoC-in-GitHub
Metasploit modules
none listed
Metasploit Framework

Sources

  • CNACVSS 3.19.92026-11-01
  • CNAweakness (CWE)CWE-22, CWE-23, CWE-592026-11-01
  • NVDweakness (CWE)CWE-22, CWE-23, CWE-59read 2026-11-01

Identifiers

Technical details

CVSS v3 Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Published
2026-11-01
Last Modified
2026-11-01
NVD status
Received

Frequently asked questions

What is CVE-2026-120307?

The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant's container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount's source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker's own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod's Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.

Is CVE-2026-120307 actively exploited?

Active exploitation of CVE-2026-120307 has not been confirmed.

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-120307?

CVE-2026-120307 has a CVSS v3 base score of 9.9 (CRITICAL severity), with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H.

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