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No exploitation reported

CVE-2026-110879

No exploitation reported by the sources we read.

  • Published2026-10-28
  • WeaknessCWE-502

Am I affected?

With a domain, we read the version its public headers and pages expose. A distribution build can carry the fix under an older number.

Description

jackson-databind validates the outer class of a class-name type ID but accepts attacker-selected classes inside its generic arguments, even when those classes violate the declared type or would be rejected as direct type IDs. This bypasses the generic-argument validation added for CVE-2026-54512 (GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm), of which this is an incomplete fix. DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() checks the outer class against the declared base type and then passes each argument from the type ID to _validateTypeParameter(), which validates the argument against the outer base type rather than enforcing its corresponding declared generic binding. It also invokes validators with arguments that have not passed the subtype check those validators expect. Under the default DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator this accepts an unrelated class inside a generic subtype even when the same class is rejected as a direct type ID. Where an allowIfBaseType(...) rule approves the outer type, Jackson substitutes LaissezFaireSubTypeValidator, so the configured validator no longer restricts the embedded arguments. The element type of a plain array type ID such as [Lpkg.Gadget; is likewise left unvalidated once the array's base type is approved. Affected paths include annotation-based class-name polymorphism with a default Jackson 3.x JsonMapper, configured default typing in both Jackson 2.x and 3.x, and integrations that expose that default typing. The default-validator case requires no application-authored validator: with @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS), a direct gadget type ID is rejected as "Not a subtype", while a type ID naming a generic wrapper around the same gadget is accepted and deserialized, including attacker-supplied bean properties. Where class-name default typing permits Map, a property declared as Map<String,String> accepts HashMap<FileSystemXmlApplicationContext,String>; map-key discovery then passes the attacker-controlled JSON property name to the selected class's one-string constructor. With Spring on the classpath and attacker-controlled XML the application can load, that constructor loads the XML and invokes ProcessBuilder.start() under the application account, giving arbitrary command execution. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 2.10.0 and tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 3.0.0. Releases before 2.10.0 are not affected, because PolymorphicTypeValidator was introduced in jackson-databind 2.10.0.

Timeline

dates in UTC
  1. 2026-10-2801:16CVE publishedNVD

Observed activity

isMalicious corpus · updated 2026-10-28 09:37 UTC
Indicators tagged with this CVE, per day0 indicators over 7 days
Block these indicators
  • Firewall list (EDL, text): https://api.ismalicious.com/edl/cve/CVE-2026-110879?format=txt
  • CSV export: https://api.ismalicious.com/edl/cve/CVE-2026-110879?format=csv
  • TAXII collection of exploited CVEs
  • The EDL and CSV take an API key on the Pro plan.

Versions per branch

Neither OSV.dev nor the vendor advisories we read list affected versions for CVE-2026-110879 yet.

Full record on NVD

Fix

No fix published by the sources we read yet. NVD record

Detection

Nuclei template
none so far
ProjectDiscovery
Exploit-DB
no entry
Exploit-DB
Proof-of-concept repositories
none listed
PoC-in-GitHub

Sources

  • NVDCVE recordread 2026-10-28
  • CNACVSS 3.19.8read 2026-10-28
  • CNAweakness (CWE)CWE-502read 2026-10-28

Technical details

CVSS v3 Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Published
2026-10-28
Last Modified
2026-10-28
NVD status
Received

Frequently asked questions

What is CVE-2026-110879?

jackson-databind validates the outer class of a class-name type ID but accepts attacker-selected classes inside its generic arguments, even when those classes violate the declared type or would be rejected as direct type IDs. This bypasses the generic-argument validation added for CVE-2026-54512 (GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm), of which this is an incomplete fix. DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() checks the outer class against the declared base type and then passes each argument from the type ID to _validateTypeParameter(), which validates the argument against the outer base type rather than enforcing its corresponding declared generic binding. It also invokes validators with arguments that have not passed the subtype check those validators expect. Under the default DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator this accepts an unrelated class inside a generic subtype even when the same class is rejected as a direct type ID. Where an allowIfBaseType(...) rule approves the outer type, Jackson substitutes LaissezFaireSubTypeValidator, so the configured validator no longer restricts the embedded arguments. The element type of a plain array type ID such as [Lpkg.Gadget; is likewise left unvalidated once the array's base type is approved. Affected paths include annotation-based class-name polymorphism with a default Jackson 3.x JsonMapper, configured default typing in both Jackson 2.x and 3.x, and integrations that expose that default typing. The default-validator case requires no application-authored validator: with @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS), a direct gadget type ID is rejected as "Not a subtype", while a type ID naming a generic wrapper around the same gadget is accepted and deserialized, including attacker-supplied bean properties. Where class-name default typing permits Map, a property declared as Map<String,String> accepts HashMap<FileSystemXmlApplicationContext,String>; map-key discovery then passes the attacker-controlled JSON property name to the selected class's one-string constructor. With Spring on the classpath and attacker-controlled XML the application can load, that constructor loads the XML and invokes ProcessBuilder.start() under the application account, giving arbitrary command execution. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 2.10.0 and tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 3.0.0. Releases before 2.10.0 are not affected, because PolymorphicTypeValidator was introduced in jackson-databind 2.10.0.

Is CVE-2026-110879 actively exploited?

Active exploitation of CVE-2026-110879 has not been confirmed.

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-110879?

CVE-2026-110879 has a CVSS v3 base score of 9.8 (CRITICAL severity), with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.

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