CVE-2025-39682
CVSS v3
9.8
CRITICAL
EPSS Score
1.2 %
exploit probability
CISA KEV
Yes
known exploited
Exploitation
—
SSVC status
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there. Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length). Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.
CISA Known Exploited Vulnerability
- Date Added
- 2026-09-18
- Patch Due Date
- 2026-09-21
- Ransomware Use
- Unknown
Technical details
- CVSS v3 Vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Published
- 2025-09-05
- Last Modified
- 2026-09-18
Frequently asked questions
What is CVE-2025-39682?
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there. Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length). Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.
Is CVE-2025-39682 actively exploited?
Yes. CVE-2025-39682 is on the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, meaning it has been confirmed as actively exploited in the wild. CISA requires federal agencies to patch by 2026-09-21.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2025-39682?
CVE-2025-39682 has a CVSS v3 base score of 9.8 (CRITICAL severity), with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
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