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No exploitation reportedFix available

CVE-2026-42027

No exploitation reported by the sources we read.

  • Published2026-05-04
  • Fixed in2.5.9
  • WeaknessCWE-470 · CWE-502

Am I affected?

With a domain, we read the version its public headers and pages expose. A distribution build can carry the fix under an older number.

Description

Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader Versions Affected: before 1.9.5, before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3 Description:  The ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String) method loads a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invokes its no-arg constructor, with the class name sourced from the manifest.properties entry of a model archive. The existing isAssignableFrom check correctly rejects classes that are not subtypes of the expected extension interface (BaseToolFactory for factory=, ArtifactSerializer for serializer-class-*), but the check runs after Class.forName() has already loaded and initialized the named class. Class.forName() with default initialization semantics executes the target class's static initializer before returning, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive can cause the static initializer of any class on the classpath to run during model loading, regardless of whether that class passes the subsequent type check. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer (for example, JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, or filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not a drop-in remote code execution; however, the attack surface grows as third-party model distribution becomes more common (community model repositories, Hugging Face-style sharing), where users routinely load model files from origins they do not control. A secondary, narrower vector affects deployments that ship legitimate BaseToolFactory or ArtifactSerializer subclasses with side-effecting no-arg constructors: a malicious manifest can name such a class and force its constructor to run during model load. Mitigation:  * 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9. * 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3. Note: The fix introduces a package-prefix allowlist that is consulted before Class.forName() is invoked, so the static initializer of a disallowed class is never executed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing factories or serializers outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all model files are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, particularly any that perform JNDI lookups, network requests, or filesystem operations during class initialization.

Timeline

dates in UTC
  1. 2026-05-0417:16CVE publishedNVD

Observed activity

isMalicious corpus · updated 2026-10-23 18:48 UTC
Indicators tagged with this CVE, per day0 indicators over 7 days
Block these indicators
  • Firewall list (EDL, text): https://api.ismalicious.com/edl/cve/CVE-2026-42027?format=txt
  • CSV export: https://api.ismalicious.com/edl/cve/CVE-2026-42027?format=csv
  • TAXII collection of exploited CVEs
  • The EDL and CSV take an API key on the Pro plan.

Versions per branch

NVD
Apache opennlp
BranchAffectedFixed in
2.5< 2.5.92.5.9
3.0= 3.0.0no fix published

as publishedRanges as NVD and OSV publish them; a distribution’s build can be fixed under an older number.

Fix

  1. Update Apache opennlp to 2.5.9

Advisories and patches

Detection

Nuclei template
none so far
ProjectDiscovery
Exploit-DB
no entry
Exploit-DB
Proof-of-concept repositories
none listed
PoC-in-GitHub

Sources

  • NVDCVE recordread 2026-10-23
  • CISA-ADPSSVC decisionnone2026-05-05
  • OpenCVESSVC decisionnone—
  • CISA-ADPCVSS 3.19.82026-05-05
  • CNACVSS 3.17.5read 2026-10-23
  • CNAweakness (CWE)CWE-470, CWE-502read 2026-10-23
  • FIRST EPSSEPSS score1.3 %2026-10-22

Technical details

CVSS v3 Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Published
2026-05-04
Last Modified
2026-09-09
NVD status
Modified

Frequently asked questions

What is CVE-2026-42027?

Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader Versions Affected: before 1.9.5, before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3 Description:  The ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String) method loads a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invokes its no-arg constructor, with the class name sourced from the manifest.properties entry of a model archive. The existing isAssignableFrom check correctly rejects classes that are not subtypes of the expected extension interface (BaseToolFactory for factory=, ArtifactSerializer for serializer-class-*), but the check runs after Class.forName() has already loaded and initialized the named class. Class.forName() with default initialization semantics executes the target class's static initializer before returning, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive can cause the static initializer of any class on the classpath to run during model loading, regardless of whether that class passes the subsequent type check. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer (for example, JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, or filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not a drop-in remote code execution; however, the attack surface grows as third-party model distribution becomes more common (community model repositories, Hugging Face-style sharing), where users routinely load model files from origins they do not control. A secondary, narrower vector affects deployments that ship legitimate BaseToolFactory or ArtifactSerializer subclasses with side-effecting no-arg constructors: a malicious manifest can name such a class and force its constructor to run during model load. Mitigation:  * 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9. * 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3. Note: The fix introduces a package-prefix allowlist that is consulted before Class.forName() is invoked, so the static initializer of a disallowed class is never executed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing factories or serializers outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all model files are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, particularly any that perform JNDI lookups, network requests, or filesystem operations during class initialization.

Is CVE-2026-42027 actively exploited?

Active exploitation of CVE-2026-42027 has not been confirmed. Its EPSS score was 1.3% on 2026-10-22, the estimated probability of exploitation in the next 30 days.

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-42027?

CVE-2026-42027 has a CVSS v3 base score of 7.5 (HIGH severity), with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.

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