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No exploitation reported

CVE-2017-8413

No exploitation reported by the sources we read.

  • Published2019-07-02
  • WeaknessCWE-77

Am I affected?

With a domain, we read the version its public headers and pages expose. A distribution build can carry the fix under an older number.

Description

An issue was discovered on D-Link DCS-1100 and DCS-1130 devices. The device runs a custom daemon on UDP port 5978 which is called "dldps2121" and listens for broadcast packets sent on 255.255.255.255. This daemon handles custom D-Link UDP based protocol that allows D-Link mobile applications and desktop applications to discover D-Link devices on the local network. The binary processes the received UDP packets sent from any device in "main" function. One path in the function traverses towards a block of code that handles commands to be executed on the device. The custom protocol created by D-Link follows the following pattern: Packetlen, Type of packet; M=MAC address of device or broadcast; D=Device Type;C=base64 encoded command string;test=1111. If a packet is received with the packet type being "S" or 0x53 then the string passed in the "C" parameter is base64 decoded and then executed by passing into a System API. We can see at address 0x00009B44 that the string received in packet type subtracts 0x31 or "1" from the packet type and is compared against 0x22 or "double quotes". If that is the case, then the packet is sent towards the block of code that executes a command. Then the value stored in "C" parameter is extracted at address 0x0000A1B0. Finally, the string received is base 64 decoded and passed on to the system API at address 0x0000A2A8 as shown below. The same form of communication can be initiated by any process including an attacker process on the mobile phone or the desktop and this allows a third-party application on the device to execute commands on the device without any authentication by sending just 1 UDP packet with custom base64 encoding.

Timeline

dates in UTC
  1. 2019-07-0221:15CVE publishedNVD
  2. 2026-10-2319:23EPSS crossed 10 %FIRST EPSS

Observed activity

isMalicious corpus · updated 2026-10-23 18:48 UTC
Indicators tagged with this CVE, per day0 indicators over 7 days
Block these indicators
  • Firewall list (EDL, text): https://api.ismalicious.com/edl/cve/CVE-2017-8413?format=txt
  • CSV export: https://api.ismalicious.com/edl/cve/CVE-2017-8413?format=csv
  • TAXII collection of exploited CVEs
  • The EDL and CSV take an API key on the Pro plan.

Versions per branch

NVD
Dlink dcs-1100 firmwareversion to verify
BranchAffectedFixed in
—all versionsno fix published
Dlink dcs-1130 firmwareversion to verify
BranchAffectedFixed in
—all versionsno fix published

as publishedRanges as NVD and OSV publish them; a distribution’s build can be fixed under an older number.

Fix

No fix published by the sources we read yet. NVD record

Detection

Nuclei template
none so far
ProjectDiscovery
Exploit-DB
no entry
Exploit-DB
Proof-of-concept repositories
none listed
PoC-in-GitHub

Sources

  • NVDCVSS 3.18.8read 2026-10-23
  • NVDCVSS 2.08.3read 2026-10-23
  • NVDweakness (CWE)CWE-77read 2026-10-23
  • FIRST EPSSEPSS score10.2 %read 2026-10-23

Technical details

CVSS v3 Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Published
2019-07-02
Last Modified
2026-06-17
NVD status
Modified

Frequently asked questions

What is CVE-2017-8413?

An issue was discovered on D-Link DCS-1100 and DCS-1130 devices. The device runs a custom daemon on UDP port 5978 which is called "dldps2121" and listens for broadcast packets sent on 255.255.255.255. This daemon handles custom D-Link UDP based protocol that allows D-Link mobile applications and desktop applications to discover D-Link devices on the local network. The binary processes the received UDP packets sent from any device in "main" function. One path in the function traverses towards a block of code that handles commands to be executed on the device. The custom protocol created by D-Link follows the following pattern: Packetlen, Type of packet; M=MAC address of device or broadcast; D=Device Type;C=base64 encoded command string;test=1111. If a packet is received with the packet type being "S" or 0x53 then the string passed in the "C" parameter is base64 decoded and then executed by passing into a System API. We can see at address 0x00009B44 that the string received in packet type subtracts 0x31 or "1" from the packet type and is compared against 0x22 or "double quotes". If that is the case, then the packet is sent towards the block of code that executes a command. Then the value stored in "C" parameter is extracted at address 0x0000A1B0. Finally, the string received is base 64 decoded and passed on to the system API at address 0x0000A2A8 as shown below. The same form of communication can be initiated by any process including an attacker process on the mobile phone or the desktop and this allows a third-party application on the device to execute commands on the device without any authentication by sending just 1 UDP packet with custom base64 encoding.

Is CVE-2017-8413 actively exploited?

Active exploitation of CVE-2017-8413 has not been confirmed. Its EPSS score was 10.2% on 2026-10-22, the estimated probability of exploitation in the next 30 days.

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2017-8413?

CVE-2017-8413 has a CVSS v3 base score of 8.8 (HIGH severity), with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.

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